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Resumen
En este artículo se analizan dos estrategias novedosas de competencia en el sector 
bancario: la banca como servicio (banking-as-a-service) y la prestación de servicios 
más allá de la banca (beyond banking). Se argumenta que estos modelos de negocio 
emulan la penetración de las BigTech en la prestación de servicios financieros con 
el trasfondo de su actividad comercial. Pero estos modelos conllevan nuevos 
riesgos, que requieren respuestas regulatorias adecuadas en una doble vía. En 
primer lugar, se afirma que la regulación del modelo de competencia disruptivo de 
las BigTech —en la confluencia de los servicios financieros y la tecnología— precisa 
de instrumentos de coordinación novedosos entre las distintas áreas de política 
regulatoria involucradas (banca, pagos, competencia, tecnología digital y datos), así 
como de una nueva perspectiva sobre el tratamiento de los conglomerados mixtos 
que consolidan múltiples líneas de negocio y riesgos. En segundo lugar, el hecho de que 
la «banca como servicio» se base en un pseudo-leasing de la licencia bancaria a 
empresas no financieras, al objeto de ganar una base transaccional, plantea riesgos 
morales y de modelo que exigen tratamientos específicos, no muy diferentes de 
los aplicados al modelo de «originar para distribuir». Las perspectivas de éxito del 
modelo beyond banking son poco alentadoras en su versión extrema, en la que las 
entidades de crédito pasan a ser patrocinadoras de plataformas en toda regla, 
mientras que las versiones híbridas siguen conllevando nuevos riesgos. 
Palabras clave: BigTech, open banking, regulación bancaria, banca como servicio, 
beyond banking, política de competencia, datos.
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Abstract
This paper analyses “banking-as-a-service” and “beyond banking”, two emerging 
bank competition strategies. These business models are argued to emulate the 
transaction-based inroads that BigTechs have made into finance. But they entail new 
risks that call for adequate regulatory responses along a dual track. First, it is argued 
that regulation of the disruptive competition model of BigTechs at the confluence of 
finance and technology requires new tools to coordinate the different regulatory 
policies involved (banking, payments, competition, data, digital) and a new approach 
to the treatment of mixed business conglomerates that consolidate multiple business 
lines and risks. Second, the reliance of “banking-as-a-service” on a quasi-renting-out 
of the banking licence to non-financial companies as a way of obtaining a transactional 
base poses moral hazard and model risks that require specific treatments not unlike 
the originate-to-distribute business model did. The prospects for success of the pure 
version of the “beyond banking” model, where banks become sponsors of full-fledged 
platforms, are assessed as dim, but hybrid versions still entail new risks. 
Keywords: BigTechs, open banking, bank regulation, banking-as-a-service, beyond 
banking, competition policy, data.
1 Introduction
The intent of this article is to highlight and analyse a selected number of banking and 
general regulation issues raised by the increasing digitalisation of the financial sector 
and, more specifically, by the prevalence of the economic platform model of 
distribution in a part of the market. Digitalisation has shaken up the competition 
space for retail banks [Siciliani (2018) and Vives (2019)]. New players taking either the 
form of nimble specialised operators (FinTechs) or big technology companies 
(BigTechs) are challenging bank incumbents.1 
The contest at the intersection of technology and banking can be roughly described 
as a race for innovation and customers. In addition to gaining efficiency in ancillary 
processes, banks need to adapt their core services to the new technologies rapidly 
unless they want to risk losing customers. The challenge for banks is twofold: mastering 
the experience-enhancing features of fintech solutions that permit the customisation 
of products and services for customers as well as being capable of sponsoring 
1 In this article, small letters and capital letters are used to distinguish between services and actors, i.e. fintech is an 
activity and FinTechs and BigTechs are categories of providers.
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economic platform distribution models or participating in those largely sponsored by 
BigTechs. Some of the alternatives they face seem daunting, like facing more intense 
competition in the short-term and risking being cornered by some BigTech oligopoly 
in the long term [De la Mano and Padilla (2018)]. Admittedly, customers’ trust in banks 
may prove to be a sufficient protection against such scenarios. 
But such defence ultimately hinges on the ability of regulation to reconcile stability and 
innovation. The dynamics of competition and market structure at the confluence of 
finance and technology is proving to be instrumental for such reconciliation. European 
authorities are tracking the issue closely, as evidenced by the European Banking 
Authority (2018 and 2021) where the focus is placed on the open banking arrangements 
that implement the linkages between banks’ infrastructure and the new external actors 
(FinTechs and BigTechs). The distinction between integration platforms where multiple 
side effects prevail (economic platforms) and technical platforms that target mainly 
local integration proves crucial to tell apart two versions of the regulatory reconciliation 
challenges: a demanding one that deals largely with fintech issues and a formidable 
one that confronts the agglomeration economics deployed by BigTechs. 
Against this general backdrop, this article focuses on two emerging bank business 
models (“beyond banking” and banking-as-a-service) and their specific ways of 
addressing the challenges of competition with BigTechs. The “beyond banking” 
strategy contemplates an extension of the range of products and services offered by 
banks in the new digital environment as a way to compete on an equal footing with 
BigTechs. In turn, the “banking-as-a-service” strategy seeks to expand the universe 
of new digital customers through “white-labelling” arrangements. 
Technology adaptation is a must in both cases, but banks attempt to compete as 
economic platforms in the first case while acting cooperatively in the second one. 
The reasons for the selection of these business models as topics of research from 
the broader universe of open banking arrangements are threefold. First, there are 
arguably distinct regimes of coexistence between BigTechs and banks in the long 
run, i.e. structural market outcomes of the end-game of the “innovation vs customers” 
race that avoid the specialisation profile of most open banking arrangements. The 
second and third sections of this article build the argument that banking-as-a-
service (BaaS) offers an adaptive way of doing banking while “beyond banking” 
emerges as a sort of tit-for-tat strategy against competition by BigTechs. Second, 
these business models highlight the relevance of the scale and agglomeration effects 
typical of digital competition in the BigTech part of the market. Third, they have 
received little attention and present specific regulatory challenges.
In particular, under BaaS banks may exhibit a profile of dependency on BigTechs 
that requires specific regulatory and supervisory measures. This dependency can 
be expressed economically in terms of moral hazard and model risks, especially if 
the banks’ partners are not accessible to the scrutiny of supervisors. Moreover, as a 
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“white-label” business model, where banks rent out their bank licences to non-
financial partners, BaaS is argued to need some standardisation in order to be 
properly understood and treated by regulation. On the other hand, the “beyond 
banking” model will be argued to be largely unfeasible in its purest version, despite 
some attempts to implement it, and prone to raise challenges for both banks and 
regulators. This result follows largely from the entrenched nature of competition 
between economic platforms as a result of their propensity to entail lock-in and 
agglomeration effects, in contrast to the less sticky competition forms relying on 
technical platforms only. 
The analysis of these new emerging business models also lays bare the broader 
challenges involved in reshaping the regulatory framework for the banking and 
payment system in the new world. The multiplicity of public goals at stake in the 
digital space complicates coordination between authorities. The dynamic tension 
between the preservation of financial stability objectives and the promotion of 
innovations that enhance customer service has endowed authorities with a complex 
role as arbiters of the process. Moreover, competition, data, digital and financial 
policies become less separable, which raises issues related to their respective 
ranking and associated institutionalisation and international coordination. Initial 
high-level principles to deal with some facets of these regulatory challenges, like the 
asymmetries between entity and activities-based licensing and regulation, have 
already been identified as being inconsistent and need to be reviewed. The policy 
challenges posed by BigTechs would require specific entity-based rules to be 
developed to complement insufficient activities-based requirements [Carstens et al. 
(2021)]. In this context, which invites BigTechs to be particularly cautious, the analysis 
of partnership arrangements like banking-as-a-service is important because they 
may allow direct regulation to be circumvented.
The concrete and systematic way to regulate the inroads made by BigTechs into 
finance is less clear, although some policy initiatives with cross-sectoral scope, 
particularly in Europe, may end up striking the right balance. In any case, the number 
of relevant authorities and public goals at stake will increase to such an extent that a 
“Sawteeth” model of banking regulation will be needed, a term that graphically extends 
“Twin Peaks” to a situation with multiple authorities.2 Antitrust and data authorities 
have a significant role to play now. The usual high-level principles defining the 
institutional perimeter of action for regulation and supervision have already been called 
into question [Restoy (2021)]. A sound way to start is by mapping the dependencies 
created by digital interlinkages, as planned by the European Banking Authority (2021).
The systematic exposition and discussion of all these ideas is structured as 
follows.  The second section identifies the main innovations at stake and their 
2 Unlike “Twin Peaks”, which is based on inspiration from fiction, a Sawteeth model has real mountains as the 
counterpart of its graphical message.
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economic significance. The third section explains the motives for “beyond banking” 
and “banking-as-a-service” within the overall open banking landscape and highlights 
their connection with the so far mainly transactional motives leading the incursion of 
BigTechs into finance. The final section on regulatory issues addresses the regulatory 
side of the discussion, both in relation to general issues and the specific challenges 
raised by “banking-as-a-service” and “beyond banking”.
2 Key transformations
Three major IT innovations stand behind the transformation that the business model 
of multiple industries is undergoing and, in particular, the one under way in the banking 
sector, despite its traditionally strong IT background: namely, (i) the perfection of an 
effective digital technology for communication between machines (APIs); (ii) the 
ability to store and process information with a relational focus on a large scale; and 
(iii) the development of distributed database technologies (DLT) that can even out 
the right of access to information and threaten its intermediaries. The resulting boost 
to digitisation has shaken banking and the ability of regulation to ensure fair and 
sound financial intermediation. 
2.1 APIs: “datification” of economic interactions
Application program interfaces (APIs) represent a milestone in the ability to configure 
digital communication links with a disruptive economic impact. The ability to remotely 
emulate with APIs the architecture of various traditional business models 
(e-commerce, telecommunications, remote banking, etc.) or to create new ones 
(social media, for example) has increased steadily since the time they mainly 
underpinned internet interactions through browsers [Zachariadis and Ozcan (2017)]. 
APIs can be defined as an expanded case of use of internet technology to facilitate 
communication between machines, i.e. a software intermediary that allows other 
applications to communicate, allowing them to share data. This fundamental capacity 
enabled early on the configuration of web pages as technical platforms, i.e. as a 
base for two-way business/social interaction between users and sponsors. The web 
was no longer just a static window onto the world but a configurable platform for 
interaction between buyers, sellers and sponsors. The dynamic data-oriented design 
of APIs (hence “datification”) forms the backbone of new business models, even if 
data are just ancillary components of the ultimate exchange. But it turns out that in 
banking information and data are instrumental.
APIs are no substitute for sound business models, but the economic impact of both 
their ability to emulate traditional models flexibly and to build new business 
opportunities based on data have proved to be transformative. In particular, the 
digital transformation surrounding API deployment has entailed a gradual 
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convergence between industries closely related in terms of their technological 
underpinnings. In particular, e-commerce, telecommunications and finance have 
increased their area of overlap. This general process has ended up exposing the 
often asymmetric sectoral regulatory frameworks for the traditional and the digital 
economy as the main determinant of switching costs for users. In any case, deepening 
contestability in a broad range of industries has expanded the duality between 
incumbents and new players across multiple data-intense industries. 
The strong reliance of banks on information has long made banking a natural ground 
for the operation of the transformative effects of digital technology. The largely 
immaterial nature of the inputs and the financial services provided by banks led to 
anticipation of an earlier adoption of APIs as a remote business emulation technology. 
But the first APIs were deployed much later in banking than in, for example, 
e-commerce. The close link between subsequent API adoption in banking and the 
deepening of e-commerce with heterogeneous applications across products 
indicates that technology is not the only factor to consider in banking (see the section 
below on natural market domains). Philippon (2015) even argues that advances in 
financial technology have failed to reduce intermediation costs, possibly for 
oligopolistic competition reasons. In any case, this observation does not detract 
from the power of technology to transform the market structure by allowing 
competition on a remote basis and the entry of new players. But an alternative 
transformation of market structure leading to an intensification of oligopolistic 
competition in the long run is also possible in the presence of network effects (see 
the section below on the industrialisation of data-based interactions).
The profile of the new players empowered in banking by their expertise in API-related 
technology obviously exhibits a particular strength in the software techniques 
underlying API deployment. But this characterisation is not sufficiently specific from 
the structural and regulatory perspective of this article. The breadth of the 
characterisation leads to inclusion in the same bag of both nimble players capable 
of providing a data-financial services mix to a bounded range of customers (FinTechs) 
and the big technology operators that can run data and financial business at scale 
(BigTechs). BigTechs may be characterised as evolved and highly successful forms 
of FinTechs as regards their technology orientation. The ultimate differentiating 
feature between FinTechs and BigTechs proves to be the economic and managerial 
drivers for their expansion into finance. A broadly held consensus taken on board 
here is the differential role of data in the business operations of FinTechs and 
BigTechs. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has coined the acronym DNA 
loop to characterise the distinct identity of BigTechs where “D” stands for data, “N” 
for network and “A” for activities [Bank for International Settlements (2020)].
The dichotomic characterisation of the new players based on their scale of expertise 
in API technology is only a useful approximation. It turns out that, in some emerging 
market (EM) countries, it is not uncommon to witness telecom companies, such as 
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M-Pesa in Kenya, that have ventured into financial services on the basis of a 
comparative advantage afforded by their competences in the network hardware 
layer rather than the software one [Jack and Suri (2011)]. Also the meaning of the 
scale of the financial operations and the use of APIs requires qualifications. Neo-
banks, i.e. fully digital banks that operate only online, also seek scale in their 
operations, albeit in a production function sense, based on the use of basic software 
modules. The next subsection clarifies the more transformative meaning of scale 
that shapes the regulatory challenges posed by BigTechs.
2.2 Industrialisation of data-based interactions
The ability to source, process and store data at large scale imparts a multiplicative 
effect to the transformations unleashed by API-based service delivery models. The 
magnitude of the disruptions under those conditions is summarised by the winner-
takes-all proposition regarding the nature of BigTechs’ power.
The disruptive economics of industrialised data-based interactions is fundamentally 
grounded in the presence of strong direct and, especially, indirect network effects, i.e. the 
“N” of the BIS acronym “DNA”. Direct network effects result from the economies of scale 
associated with the per-participant surplus of a larger coalition of buyers and sellers. In 
turn, indirect network effects arise through the improved opportunities to interact as a 
result of the depth made possible by thick connectivity [Farrell and Klemperer (2007)].
Enhanced processing power and connectivity capabilities have enabled cloud 
computing, a technological breakthrough that underpins the role of direct network 
effects as the economic driver of new business models, as well as “software as a 
service”, an approach to exploit IT resources that seeks economies of scale by 
sharing investment and maintenance costs across a large number of users. This has 
proved to be a powerful source of economies of scale for BigTechs. Moreover, cloud 
computing facilitates the economy of data agglomeration and its ensuing multiplicative 
effects, all of them under the control of the same small group of large technological 
firms. The ability to apply and deepen AI or machine learning techniques in such an 
integrated environment is a fundamental mechanism that sustains actionable models 
of data monetisation [Ciuriak (2018)]. Data gluttony proves also to be self-reinforcing 
and reserved to the big operators.
The comparative advantage of these “industrial” new players is thus twofold. First, 
the agglomeration processes that they can sustain on the basis of their ability to 
exploit data and data processing technology at scale. Second, the dependence of 
incumbents in other sectors on these technological firms in their transition from their 
legacy technology [Baker et al. (2020)]. The threat of a squeeze on the business 
model of incumbents shapes the fundamental step of regulating BigTechs’ entry into 
finance (see the section below on general policy issues and tools).
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In banking, the role of data and information has traditionally departed from the model 
applied by BigTechs. The “internal” monetisation of information in the former 
contrasts with the “external” or relational approach in the latter. The term “internal” 
here is intended to mean the use of information as an input for cross-selling or risk 
mitigation. In contrast, the meaning of “external” refers to the recourse to the working 
of actual markets for information as a mechanism to boost revenues [Bergemann 
and Bonatti (2019)]. This information market in principle faces no limitations as 
regards the goods and services markets that it may support. Monetisation of data 
based on the social data model by BigTechs exploits the mark-up resulting from the 
difference between the value of the information provided by users of BigTech services 
and the (usually free) services provided to them [Bergemann and Bonatti (2019)].
Importantly, leaving aside the handicap for banks posed by legacy IT systems and 
the potential inertia of regulatory regimes to adapt to the new conditions, a fundamental 
asymmetry prevails as regards their data monetisation abilities. BigTechs can exploit 
data either way. The different business models for data imply different intrinsic growth 
dynamics, competitive threats and risks. BigTechs’ ability to capture supply and 
demand in some business or social ecosystem online tends to be rewarded by a 
more than proportional expansion of their revenues through a “data multiplier”. In 
turn, banks’ growth dynamics largely reflect the working of the credit and payment 
mechanisms. Their ability to access markets for information is more difficult and 
riskier. Large scale entry of banks into informational markets may be very difficult 
because their current scale might be insufficient to obtain sufficient benefits from 
data aggregation. Only a challenging expansion of banks to a “beyond banking” 
business model could result in some parallels with the use of data by BigTechs. 
The asymmetric access to data of BigTechs and bank incumbents impinges also on 
their lending technology and ability to compete across the spectrum of financial 
services. The screening of credit by banks balances soft information with hard data, 
like financial statements, credit scores and collateral, depending on intrinsic features 
of the portfolios, such as borrowers’ opacity and the transactional character of the 
deals. The monitoring may also include significant variables like deposit account flows 
and repayment patterns. In turn, in the absence of bank-type relationships with their 
customers, FinTechs and BigTechs can simply exploit alternative data and customised 
algorithmic scores when considering entry into credit intermediation. The competitive 
advantage across products of bank incumbents and new players should not be 
expected to be homogeneous. Rather it should correlate both with the relative intensity 
of the hard vs soft information sources necessary to service the different products and 
the convenience of the quantitative tools employed, if any [Balyuk et al. (2020)]. 
All in all, data-based competition between BigTechs and bank incumbents is not entirely 
determined by the agglomeration advantages of the former, as the advantages of data 
specificity enjoyed by incumbents can also be exploited. Portfolios better served with 
soft and relational information are thus a natural space for banks to occupy. In turn, 
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transactional portfolios are the natural battleground for competition. Regulation should 
be expected to be crucial in the protection of a competitive balance that hinges on 
information, especially in hybrid business models like BaaS where screening may follow 
an intermediate bank-BigTech logic (see the section below on BaaS and regulation). 
Also, data regulators are already examining the different customer protection issues 
associated with big data and bank scoring tools [Hurley and Adebayo (2017)].
2.3 Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)
The representation of information through chains of blocks of it (“blockchain”) is another 
noteworthy and disruptive innovation. Its impact on payments intermediation could be 
deeply transformative. The ability to create physically distributed databases subject to 
secure collective validation mechanisms gives rise to scenarios where the structures of 
collaboration between economic agents may change radically. In particular, the 
feasibility of collective certification of the integrity of databases representative of 
information on economic or financial transactions might undermine the logic of financial 
intermediation and even external enforcement if the DLT allows smart-contracting
Unsurprisingly, DLT technology3 features prominently in the main building blocks of 
the strategic initiatives of some of the new financial services players. The diversity of 
services envisaged to benefit from DLT use is broad. Fully decentralised arrangements 
(DeFi) seek to replace bank intermediation entirely. But the thrust of DLT has proved 
to be especially strong in the field of payment and money-like instruments replacing 
classical chains of value with tokens. In particular, “stablecoins” stand out as another 
potential disruptor of value storage and transfer mechanisms due to a hybrid profile 
that seeks DLT-based innovation and asset-backed stability. 
The delivery of services in economic platforms endowed with proprietary tokens or 
capable of entering into smart contracts proves to be particularly sticky. The barriers 
to entry to the platform and the switching costs out of it are magnified both when 
tokens create value local to the platform and when the smart contracting ability 
reduces monitoring/enforcement costs. 
3  Competition between incumbents and newcomers. From branches to BaaS 
or platforms?
The IT innovations described above are already leaving a footprint on banking 
competition and market structure. Some of the symptoms of the transformations 
under way in banking are well known. Chart 1 displays for the specific case of Spain 
3 DLT refers to the technology that allows the operation of a decentralized distributed database, in particular 
validation and immutable record updating at the different sites of the computer network.
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the substitution of distribution channels in banking as internet penetration has 
deepened. 
Understanding the nature of competition and market structure proves to be crucial 
for any regulatory initiative. This section attempts to identify some of the salient 
features of changes in market structure resulting from the technological innovations 
described, in order to frame the specific regulatory questions addressed in the final 
section. Analytical evidence on the matter is only very partial, both from a geographic 
and sectoral perspective. Surveys conducted by authorities [European Banking 
Authority (2019)] and consultants highlight the increasing engagement of banks in 
partnerships with a diversity of FinTechs and the fears raised both by BigTechs and 
the possibility of intense competition with peers. Market reports highlight the strong 
specialisation and corporate dynamism around fintech activity across the world. 
Chart 2 conveys a sense of the FinTech-related specialisation in multiple niches.
The specialisation and diversity of FinTech-related activities indicate the operation of 
mechanisms of unbundling. APIs naturally strengthen the ability to undertake 
targeted improvements of customers’ experience and to compete accordingly. The 
vertical integration traditional in the provision or retail banking services is thus 
naturally undermined by the value creation incentives generated by technical 
innovation, unless banks can achieve it organically in time to confront new 
competitors. Importantly, the market structure determined by technological forces 
may interact with other unbundling mechanisms, possibly rooted in regulation, to 
reinforce fragmentation and shadow banking. For example, the ability of some non-
banks in the United States to originate mortgages that feed agencies’ issuance of 
mortgage-backed securities is further reinforced by the new screening technologies 
brought by FinTechs [Buchak et al. (2018)]. 
NUMBER OF BANK BRANCHES AND INTERNET BANKING PENETRATION IN SPAIN
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3.1 The strategic race activated by IT innovations 
The race between banking incumbents and new players entails straightforward 
strategic challenges for both. The former must adapt their technology and/or 
business model in accordance with the requirements posed by the relevant 
technological innovations. The latter have to attract bank customers and build their 
own franchises. Regulation can be a friction, an arbiter or an enabler in this race. 
The specific strategies of the different parties should be shaped by their respective 
vision of the transformation at stake. A vision on the bank incumbent side that 
emphasises the need for piecemeal productivity and customer experience 
improvements can be satisfied by a correspondingly targeted technology adaptation 
based on APIs operating on a standalone basis. Traditional banks which have to 
fight on several innovation fronts at once can seldom avoid having to cooperate with 
a relevant set of FinTechs or hiring their services. In any case, they must be ready to 
open up their infrastructure and customer base to partnerships that enhance the 
delivery of services or improve ancillary processes. This strategy of opening up 
the bank infrastructure (open banking) to outsiders reaches out to both FinTechs and 
BigTechs, although its effect is modulated by their different business models. 
The strategic risks for banks associated with open banking may lead to tepid IT 
adaptations in which open banking is complemented or entirely substituted by an 
internal technology update of the bank in question [Bahri and Lobo (2020)]. 
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Interestingly, the success of FinTechs in the open banking “co-opetition” landscape 
often leads to re-bundling through their incorporation as banks. Banking would thus 
still be a safe harbour in the rough waters shaken by innovation [Lantery et al. (2021)]. 
Customers’ trust in regulated banking provides a backstop.
In turn, an open banking vision that recognises the strong network effects present in 
digital economic platforms requires bank incumbents to move beyond partial 
adaptations and change their business model in a way that also seeks network 
effects or an expanded transactional base. This is the general economic logic that 
differentiates “beyond banking” and “banking-as-a-service” from other restricted 
open banking models.
The strategies available to the new potential players mirror those of bank incumbents. 
When their innovations merely bring productivity gains, they may be tempted to 
either seek partnerships with incumbents to leverage their customer base or to license 
their technology. Their operation on a standalone basis faces the drawbacks of 
having to build their customer base. When their innovative abilities include the 
provision of services generating strong network effects (BigTechs), they can aspire 
to build their own customer base. But even in this case the scope for success in 
banking depends on the overlap between the natural customer base of these non-
financial companies and the community of bank customers. 
Importantly, the strategic game should be expected to operate heterogeneously 
across banking services. As discussed above, access to data does not grant a 
uniform comparative advantage to BigTechs or to banks across products. Moreover, 
entry into the different banking segments is just an option for newcomers. The 
contribution to the value of their overall franchise may not justify moving into every 
segment if that compromises more valuable segments. BigTechs have in fact 
evidenced a cautious pace of entry in banking lines of activity other than those 
related to transactional services and payments. All in all, the trust link may both 
selectively bind bank customers to banks and keep BigTechs at bay from them other 
than in the case of products aligned with their strengths.
3.2 Natural market domains
The distribution of competitive advantage in a sector tends to shape its natural 
market structure. The strategic need to innovate or lose clients in banking has led to 
intrinsic diversity to cope with those challenges and reactions [Bahri and Lobo 
(2020)]. Some of the salient features of a rebalanced distribution of competitive 
advantage are widespread unbundling and operational fragmentation. But this 
conclusion taken from a granular perspective is consistent with a larger scale 
segmentation into domains where either the distribution of competitive advantage is 
scattered (banks partnering with FinTechs) or concentrated, as a result of the 
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operation of agglomeration processes as described in 2.1.2. The overall picture is 
thus consistent with the dynamic coexistence of a diversity of business models like 
broad open banking and other open banking arrangements like platform-based 
competition and BaaS, i.e. banks partnering with NFCs. 
In the words of Gambacorta et al. (2020) regulators must deal with a barbell-like 
market structure. The rapid growth dynamics of ventures that systematically exploit 
e-commerce-based network externalities determine the bulky domain held by 
BigTechs. In contrast, productivity enhancing innovations typical of plain open 
banking tend to exhibit a high critical mass for agglomeration [Economides and 
Himmelberg (1995)]. BaaS emerges as a bridge arrangement to reconcile traditional 
and emerging business models.
The breakdown by products of the fintech-related activity of the different segments 
is an important question as it shapes the regulatory hot spots. However, a systematic 
statistical description is hampered by the fragmentation and unregulated nature of 
the markets. Payment services, including consumer credit, represent the largest 
chunk of the open banking and platform segments. But credit provision increasingly 
plays a role in the open banking segment, especially in countries where non-bank 
institutional investors play a major role in the financial system [Ziegler et al. (2021)]. 
Chart 3 provides an overview up to 2019 of the role of FinTechs and BigTechs in the 
granting of credit. In terms of geographical quota, existing surveys suggest that 
the broad regulatory crackdown on BigTech activity in China in 2020 and 2021 has 
brought the United States to the top in terms of overall volume of activity. The chart 
also highlights the cautious approach of BigTechs to credit discussed later.
3.2.1 Open banking
There is no standard definition for open banking. Originally, the term was shaped by 
the regulatory and payment services connotations in PSD2.4 But PSD2 has 
accelerated the digital transformation of banks in Europe [Cortet et al. (2016)], while 
the term has taken an autonomous market-led path in the United States and Asia.5 
Open banking has thus surpassed the constrained meaning of opening a bank’s own 
infrastructure to payment initiations or account aggregators (as in PSD2) to a broader 
one centred around the use of API technology as a strategic tool for the delivery of 
banking services in general. This meaning of open banking in a broad sense includes 
the different variants of IT driven competition and can be also called platformisation 
[European Banking Authority (2021)], given the reliance on technical platforms to 
implement the new forms of interconnection between entities via APIs. Note that 
4 Directive (EU) 2015/2366, which regulates payment services and payment service providers in the European 
Union and the European Economic Area.
5 In the United States the standardisation of APIs undertaken by the National Automated Clearing House Association 
(NACHA) has been an enabler for the adoption.
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platformisation should not be confused with operations based on economic platforms, 
as argued in the following section.
The economic roots of open banking lie in the attempt to unbundle banking services 
to create value through inter-connection, specialisation and partnership. The fact 
that value creation can no longer be attributed to a unique organisational frontier in 
the open banking paradigm naturally shapes its strategic and regulatory challenges. 
Complexity and fragmentation are general attributes of open banking. The European 
Banking Authority (2021) provides a taxonomy of broad open banking arrangements 
following a perspective based on the type of interconnected players. BaaS and 
“beyond banking” represent specific economic arrangements of particular interest 
as will become clear.
Unsurprisingly, the challenge for bank incumbents to adapt to open banking consists 
mainly in the how and where. The taxonomy of options available is broad. A blanket 
CREDIT GRANTED BY FINTECHS AND BIGTECHS IN DIFFERENT REGIONS (2013-2019)
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adoption of open banking across instruments entails an adaptive strategy that 
stresses uniformity in the impact of technological innovation across markets. Under 
this view, the replacement of the old products and distributional channels with new 
digital “rails” and instruments becomes a competitive imperative on its own. 
Innovation is warranted even if it just emulates existing business models with lower 
costs and higher customer satisfaction. Neobanks, i.e. entirely virtual and digitally 
native banks, follow an extreme version of this approach. Banking incumbents 
typically face significant adaptation costs to a blanket overhaul of their technology 
[Ramdani et al. (2020)] and most adapt gradually. 
The retooling of traditional banks with APIs follows a restricted open banking 
paradigm that prioritises the range of services adapted. In other words, the 
deployment of APIs tends to be targeted in scope and launched in partnership with 
a diverse set of FinTechs in accordance with their specialisation.6 The business 
priorities leading to the deployment of each API reflect either regulatory priorities or 
its relevance to the business model of the bank in question. Payments processing 
and transactional services count as natural areas for deployment of APIs by banks. 
The priorities in terms of products served through APIs result from the basic principle 
of financial services value. That is to say, the financial service often does not address 
a primary client need, but it is a solution to the problem that arises when the genuine 
primary need must be satisfied. Two powerful implications in terms of deployment of 
APIs are the relevance of (i) a logic of unfilled primary needs, or (ii) the presence 
of strong complementarity relations.
The relevance of the first implication is confirmed by the increasing role of “vertical 
banking”, i.e. the arrangement of digital services delivery with a community in mind 
that is dispersed, but united by some specific feature (gender, demographic, 
geographic, profession, risk profile, etc.) and whose needs have been traditionally 
underserved. As regards the second implication, the spread of digital consumer 
finance and payment processing solutions matches the fundamental complementarity 
that exists between trade and settlement. In a similar vein, open banking APIs should 
be expected to be deployed with an ecosystem perspective. The life-cycle of 
customers’ experience of products in it should dictate the range of complementary 
services offered with an API. This scenario may apply to car loans or business loans 
as well. Onboarding, KYC and AML APIs7 also thrive among banks as they determine 
customer experience at the very basic point of the initial relationship. 
Open banking solutions typically create value within the limits of the complementarity 
chain excluding the satisfaction of the final need of the customer. In other words, the 
6 CapGemini (2021) estimates that around 89% of banks partner with FinTechs as opposed to organic innovation.
7 Onboarding APIs facilitate customers becoming familiar with the bank, its products or services. KYC (Know Your 
Customer) APIs implement standards designed to protect financial institutions against fraud and corruption based 
on digital identification and additional processes. AML APIs facilitate the control of anti-money laundering rules.
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provision of financial services to acquire a good at a point of sale (contextual finance) 
typically predominates over the alternative of arranging both the provision of the 
good and the financing of its sale to the customer. However, this business model is 
not entirely alien to traditional retail banking (leasing or a certain range of shopping). 
Ultimately, financing and buying a product may be naturally separate processes but 
their combination may create customer value under some circumstances. The 
potential application of these ideas in the digital banking world defines some of the 
features of a strategy that goes beyond traditional banking (as discussed below).
The range of applications of APIs by banks is broader. APIs can be also applied by 
banks to deliver corporate services. Trade finance can be significantly facilitated, 
especially through the recourse to DLT techniques. The delivery of corporate services 
through APIs to large companies and SMEs is also possible but tends to be less 
straightforward due to the heterogeneity of requirements, including IT integration at 
the premises of the customer. The recourse of banks to APIs that score the credit 
quality of customers looks counterintuitive, but is increasingly necessary for small 
ticket business in a disintegrated banking market. Credit scoring APIs entail rating 
customers based on big data rather than soft or bank hard data and, thus, assuming 
the trade-off between data availability and quality. 
All in all, open banking in a restricted sense is a strategy of targeted customisation 
of value that shifts banking organisations from a silo culture to collaborative 
arrangements with innovators. Technically it requires an inter-operable and actionable 
exchange of data in accordance with the business models covered. But it also poses 
the governance challenges associated with the joint delivery of services. Financial 
transaction or account data needs to be shared in a secure way, which banks can 
provide.
Restricted open banking paves the way for the two other modalities of competition 
highlighted. First, restricted open banking faces an implicit trade-off. Innovation that 
does not generate external effects tends to scale up only with difficulty due to the 
handicaps of competition and imitation. It may still entail success, i.e. a cycle 
of  growth and transformation into licensed banks for successful FinTechs or 
transformation for an incumbent bank. But the activation of agglomeration effects by 
BigTechs alter qualitatively the competitive challenges. Second, restricted open 
banking lacks a strategic foundation if it entails merely a focus on the implementation 
of use cases. BaaS emerges as a dedicated strategy to leverage the potential of 
systematic open banking. 
3.2.2 Platforms and banking
The meaning of the term platform is not uniform across contexts. Technical platforms 
facilitate interaction, broadly speaking, and accord with the meaning in European 
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Banking Authority (2021). From this perspective, open banking environments that 
operate financial service market places and connect customers to a diversity of 
potential providers qualify as platforms. Similarly, platform also refers to one-stop 
shops in a multi-seller setting. The classical paradigm of platforms are medieval 
portals (another denomination for platforms these days) where buyers and sellers 
gathered in a shared environment. Retail banks have also exploited the multi-party 
and multi-product logic of platforms by setting the location of their branches in 
shopping areas in proximity to other retail businesses. The modern economic notion 
of platforms emerges when these portals become economic actors competing “for 
the market” as opposed to providers of some specific product in some market 
[Geroski (2003)].
Economic platforms supplement the facilitation of interaction of technical platforms 
with additional functionalities aimed at actively creating synergies. The relevance of 
platforms as an economic concept has grown over the last twenty years in parallel 
with the advances in digital technology that have facilitated that process. In general 
terms, the disruptive character of platforms emerges from the synergies enabled by 
an optimised matching of buyers and sellers in a way that triggers circuits of customer 
satisfaction and platform growth. Platform sponsors provide the economic 
intelligence that sustains the operation of these transactional growth-oriented 
environments.
BigTechs tend to be successful operators of such economic platforms. Digital 
technology has empowered them to optimise market matching processes in 
disruptive ways. The economic intelligence deployed tends to rely on different forms 
of monetising data and/or cross-subsidising their services. The disruptive force of 
platforms operated by BigTechs follows from the intelligence deployed in their 
management to achieve transaction multiplier effects. The result is a market with a 
qualitatively new set of pricing and behavioural features that significantly affect the 
nature of competition with traditional operators and the ability of competition 
regulators to ensure fair markets. Their scale of operations needs to be extremely 
large as it has to match the need to remotely congregate and steer buyers and 
sellers. As a matter of fact, their scale is not only large but also elastic, because 
platform sponsors tend to also engage in the provision of external cloud computing 
services. Thus, their IT enabling business seems to be strongly complementary to 
their transactional one in a way that boosts their total franchise value. 
The economic principles exploited in the “intelligent” management of platforms 
are well known and differ from those for plain market places. Rochet and Tirole 
(2003) characterised platforms as a two-sided market environment where the 
 end-users (both buyers and sellers) do not internalise the welfare impact of their 
use of the platform on their counterparts. This paves the way for platform sponsors 
to manage the overall effect of the externalities typically in a way that optimises 
sponsors’ market value. The peculiar features of economic platforms stem directly 
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from the ability of sponsors to manage the non-linear effects of demand and 
supply externalities. The asymmetrical patterns of platform pricing for suppliers 
and customers characterised by Rochet and Tirole (2003) include free services and 
ultimately reflect the willingness of sponsors to devote resources to gain benefits 
from the different elasticities of demand and supply. Bergemann et al. (2019) 
identify the data externality generated by transaction initiators that sustains the 
working of BigTechs’ economic platforms. Moreover, they argue that the scale of 
their operations creates barriers to entry due to the ability to exploit huge amounts 
of data with AI techniques. Rietveld et al. (2019) highlight the selective promotion of 
complement products listed on platforms to indicate the general approach to 
platform management.
The scope rather than the role of BigTechs in banking is the relevant open question. 
A full-scope platform cannot operate properly without built-in financial services that 
improve customers’ experience. BigTech companies thus develop quite naturally the 
profile of some financial services in the area of payment services provision, consumer 
credit and insurance. The strong complementarity of these services with the 
underlying e-commerce business is well known to lead to bundling practices, which 
underpin the competitive advantage of BigTechs as regards access to data. 
But the complementarity argument does not necessarily imply a strong involvement 
of general purpose e-commerce platforms in the provision of financial services like 
term loans, investment products etc. unconnected with their transactional business. 
This would require a broadening of their business model from one based on flow of 
income sourced from transactional fees to one that also includes financial 
intermediation income. Certainly, this transformation was happening in China until 
the crackdown by the authorities in 2020. Such rapid evolution and involution in 
China can be accounted for by a range of local factors like pre-existing conditions of 
development in the financial sector [Gorjon (2018)], the access of BigTechs to central 
bank infrastructure and ensuing exponential growth. Elsewhere, BigTechs have been 
very cautious to venture uncooperatively into financial intermediation. Table  1 
borrows from Crisanto et al. (2020) to highlight the e-commerce/internet driver of 
their involvement in finance services and its focus on payments. 
The significance of payments for platforms correlates with the incentive for GAFAs8 
to obtain particular types of licences. They are licensed as e-transfer service 
providers in the United States, and as payment service providers in the EU (with the 
exception of Apple), whilst none of them have a banking licence. Embedding financial 
products in the platform typically requires either the inclusion of a financial company 
as a platform provider, a partnership with such a company or the possession of a 
licence. Significantly, the first model has been more common in Chinese BigTechs, 
while American players rely on partnerships when they do not use their own licences. 
8 Acronym stemming from Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon.
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Furthermore, financial services in platforms can be provided either under 
arrangements of exclusivity or that allow the entry of different banks. 
The still constrained range of financial services offered by digital platforms, focused 
so far on consumer transaction banking, does not detract from their systemic 
relevance and expansion potential. The expanded open banking space that results 
from the inclusion of these digital platforms within its realm leaves an unbalanced 
size profile. The agglomeration economics of platforms stemming from the multi-
product multi-party matching offering and the industrial exploitation of data 
determine the “bulge bracket” profile of digital platforms in an expanded open 
banking. Moreover, the expanded open banking world amounts effectively to an 
enlargement of shadow banking. 
The basis for a further expansion across bank instruments beyond transactional 
services is still unsettled. The degree of comparative advantage provided by data 
agglomeration may hold the key. On the one hand, screening models based on big 
data may be inferior to the ones combining soft and hard data in banks on non-
transactional products. Hardening soft information through credit scoring technology 
seems to have its limits [Filomeni et al. (2016)]. On the other hand, Gambacorta et al. 
(2020) argue that the use of massive amounts of data by BigTechs to assess firms’ 
creditworthiness could reduce the need for collateral to resolve asymmetric 
information problems in credit markets. The significance of digital platforms as non-
bank competitors thus raises many questions as to the reactions of banks and 
regulators and the soundness of the new financial market despite their currently 
restricted range of operations.
The recourse by banks to a “beyond banking” model has been proposed as a 
potential defensive strategy. The “beyond banking” model amounts to an attempt to 
organise banking services provision under a platform model. Traditionally, universal 
banks have been loosely called platforms due to their one-stop shop multi-product 
OVERVIEW OF BIGTECH ACTIVITY AND INVOLVEMENT IN FINANCE
Table 1
SOURCE: Crisanto et al. (2021).
Baidu  X X X X








Alibaba E-commerce X X X X
Tencent X X X X
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nature. The “beyond banking” model expands the range of products covered by 
bank platforms to bring transactional depth to their global offer. Not unlike what 
happens in the BigTech space, proponents of this nowadays fringe strategy also 
highlight the multiplier effects that deepening the recourse to data sources could 
have for banking when combined with advanced analytics services [Ernst and Young 
(2021)]. A weaker form of the “beyond banking” model renounces the benefits of two-
sided platforms to promote instead “digital ecosystems”, i.e. conglomerates of 
several distinct services accessible digitally.
The “beyond banking” model can be said to emerge ultimately through an apparent 
data mirage as a way of competing with BigTechs. The agglomeration dynamics of 
BigTechs’ portals sustained by smart data management are grounded on their ability 
to satisfy the transactional needs of customers in the first place. Absent such 
capacity on the side of incumbents, better data management on their part can have 
an impact that, albeit weaker, is still significant. For example, a focus by incumbents 
on supporting the satisfaction of the primary needs of customers would lead naturally 
to arrangements that permit the identification of the need, in the right context and at 
the right time. “Contextual finance” solutions can be a natural strategy for incumbents 
to counteract their lack of a transactional base. But they are typically only possible 
under partnership arrangements with non-bank companies that lead to BaaS (as 
discussed below).
Ultimately, effective imitation of the BigTech model by banks would seem to entail 
the construction of an entire transactional business platform. Such a “beyond 
banking” model of banking amounts to the creation of one-stop shops for the 
purchase of both banking products and goods. The closest arrangement to such an 
ecosystem has been developed in Asia by BigTechs rather than banks. The difficulties 
for banks to become sponsors of new portals, going beyond their traditional role can 
be substantial [Jacobides (2019)]. 
Nonetheless, “beyond banking” can mean something less ambitious than a fully-
fledged portal. A restricted form of platform banking means a limited extension of 
the ecosystem notion of products to include final needs close to the bank financial 
services actually provided. For example, in the field of mortgage banking, platform 
complementarity would dictate that banks not only provide loans, but also facilitate 
homeowner’s insurance, house maintenance services, or even furniture.
Nonetheless, a “beyond banking” model of banking has already made inroads in some 
jurisdictions like Russia. The section below on platforms and banks summarises 
some of the regulatory concerns with this model. A fundamental reason for those 
concerns is the sustainability of such a strategy in the light of the disparity of IT 
capacity between banks and BigTechs. In this regard, it is worth remembering that 
the stock market capitalisation of GAFA hovers around two times that of the world’s 
30 largest banks.
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3.2.3 Banking-as-a-service (BaaS)
The lack of a transactional base to implement a pure economic platform model has 
led banks to seek partnerships and associations with non-banks. The result is BaaS, 
a “white-label” form of banking. The distribution of “white-label” goods is a 
consolidated practice outside the financial services market. The logic is typically 
grounded in the desire of retailers to enhance their share of profits in the vertical 
product chain [Berges-Sennou et al. (2004)]. Private label banking, in contrast, 
follows a supply side logic. The API revolution has made possible a diversity of 
collaborative arrangements with non-banks or FinTechs that break with the traditional 
model of distributing banking services.
Like in software-as-a-service (SaaS) and similar composites, the delivery of BaaS 
consists in replacing the business capital that would normally underpin the provision 
of banking services with a contract that grants the right to have direct access to 
the flow of those services. More specifically, the capital at stake under BaaS is the 
banking licence and the services of a bank with their associated balance of rights 
and duties. The non-financial company in the position of buyer under a BaaS contract 
acquires the right to outsource the provision of banking services to a licensed bank 
that finances the transactions of the former with its clients. 
BaaS makes it possible for non-banks to “provide” banking services to their customers 
by drawing on the services of the bank acting in a “white-label” capacity. For the 
bank itself, BaaS widens the network of customers accessible via such a context-
based model of distribution. The working of the arrangement resembles legally the 
combination of bank agency and outsourcing contracts that substitutes for the network 
of branches. Ideally, BaaS offers scalability, something that distinguishes it from 
strategic partnerships with FinTechs. Multiple non-bank partners may access a BaaS 
platform that replaces customised arrangements more typical of partnerships with 
FinTechs in the pure open banking model with some degree of standardisation. 
The potential for seamless deployment of BaaS via APIs makes it a unique form of 
bank competition. BaaS apparently allows the competition from BigTechs to be 
confronted by accessing external transactional pools of goods. Furthermore, their 
scope is potentially broader than the expected pool of goods in e-commerce 
platforms, which is generally limited to personal items. In other words, the overall 
bank balance sheet could notionally feed BaaS business if the technical platform for 
consistent deployment of multiple APIs is functional. In that scenario, the main 
constraint would be the risk appetite for such a model of distribution. 
However, cursory evidence suggests that BaaS still covers mainly the money 
ecosystem of bank offerings, i.e. debit and credit card processing, BNPL instruments 
and current account services [CapGemini (2021)]. Credit screening or underwriting 
that falls outside the credit consumer perimeter appears to be less frequent although 
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increasingly present. The outcome should be determined by a mix of complementarity, 
risk appetite and customer convenience determinants. Interestingly, the indirect 
access to a transactional base ideally permits BaaS banks to monetise data in ways 
that traditional banks have never succeeded in doing. Although banks have had lots 
of information, the absence of a transactional base as a strategic lever has led to 
entrenched silos of information within the organisation.
Non-bank partners in BaaS contracts are not constrained to be technological 
companies thanks to the flexibility of APIs. Retailers, providers of hospitality or 
healthcare services and even providers of mobility services are reported to have 
associated with banks in BaaS arrangements. These partnerships are primarily 
perceived to deepen the recognition of trademarks, in addition to the service provided 
to the customers. Even banks can be partners of payments-as-a-service arrangements 
that implement in a plug-and-play way cards, payments clearing, cross-border 
payments, etc., that can moreover be distributed to end-customers. FinTechs also 
count as potential partners.
However, BigTechs stand out as the most significant partners in BaaS arrangements 
(see Table  2). The advance of BaaS arrangements with BigTechs is especially 
noticeable in the United States. The biggest e-commerce and internet companies 
(GAFA) have consolidated partnerships with either major banks or even networks of 
banks. The inclusion of a chequing account within the offering of a BigTech app in 
2021 (PLEX) and its swift removal soon afterwards despite signs of its good reception 
by customers, constitute a case that raises questions as to the limits of BigTech 
involvement in the provision of regulated financial services provision. 
But, as mentioned before, BigTechs are also important actors in the provision of 
inputs for BaaS. The ability of banks to smoothly provide bank services in a distributed 
way across a broad range of products hinges on computer applications running in 
the cloud. Banks need to transform their traditional IT infrastructure into a Lego-like 
PROMINENT EXAMPLES OF BAAS DEALS
Table 2
SOURCE: Own elaboration from press sources.
setoNpihsrentraPknab SaaBhceTgiB
Google Citi + 11 community banks PLEX deposit account Checking account and services integrated 
in Google Play with access to Citi ATMs
Apple  Goldman Sachs 4x1 Card Credit, Debit, Walltet and P2P payments
in one. Incentives to acquire Apple
Amazon  Goldman Sachs SME credit lines Credit line for SMEs vendors in Amazon
Access to data included
Uber  BBVA Deposit and debit card for Uber drivers Deposit accounts
for drivers in Mexico
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architecture to deliver the functionalities required by the different APIs. This is more 
easily done de novo on virtual machines in the cloud. BaaS banks thus need to enter 
into service agreements with the cloud subsidiaries of BigTechs. But the market 
share of the three largest cloud infrastructure providers hovers around 60% and 
software services exhibit significant vertical integration. The dependency can 
become both economic and technological.
BigTechs can thus squeeze the business model of BaaS banks through two 
simultaneous relationships. A strong reliance on BigTechs can constrain the revenues 
of these banks at the same time as their IT costs are shaped by them. Moreover, the 
capital expenditure required to update the overall technological model means that 
BaaS is only accessible to banks of a certain size. Ultimately, BaaS may end up 
becoming a “utility trap” if the banks adopting this strategy fail to diversify or 
differentiate their BaaS offering. The risk of a market place developing that 
concentrates the supply of BaaS “commodities” would be a doom outcome for 
banks. Banks therefore need to taint their “white-offering” with some traces of “grey” 
to be recognisable. Additionally, the diversification of BaaS partners is a fundamental 
strategy to avoid these perils. If economic dependency on BigTechs is to be avoided 
then the technical platforms need to be exploited under multiple BaaS contracts. 
The regulatory challenges posed by BaaS are covered in Section 4.2. 
4 Regulatory issues
This section covers selected policy implications of the “beyond banking” and 
banking-as-a-service models of competition. A systematic analysis of regulatory 
fintech issues is beyond the scope of this work. The Basel Committee has included 
in its work programme for 2021-2022 the analysis of the impact of ongoing 
digitalisation and financial disintermediation on banks’ business models and the 
banking system more generally [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2021)]. 
The selection of topics addressed here corresponds to some of the salient issues 
highlighted in the previous section, namely, the challenges posed by competition 
with BigTechs’ platforms and banks “lending” their licences under BaaS contracts. 
The first topic is addressed in two parts: (1) the general issue of coordinating a more 
diverse set of relevant policies to address open banking and BigTechs’ entry into 
financial services; (2) the specific challenges of a banking model where banks 
develop their own platforms.
4.1 General policy issues and tools
The territory in which competition, regulatory and supervisory policies have 
traditionally operated has been altered by the structural and behavioural effects of 
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digital technology. Some relevant features of broad open banking environments are 
fragmentation of the value chain, dependencies and concentration risks, especially 
in the space covered by BigTechs. 
Fragmentation raises a diversity of new risks and concerns like operational risks, 
data integrity, enhanced competition or regulatory/supervisory instruments. 
Fragmentation issues have a broader scope than considered in the current article, 
and the policy-oriented literature on different aspects is blossoming. Ehrentraud et 
al. (2021) provide a review of cross-country policies adopted to deal with a diversity 
of cases of use of fintech. Krahnen and Langenbucher (2020) and Langenbucher et 
al. (2020) highlight regulatory and supervisory lessons from the default of Wirecard 
and the need to lift the veil created by the complex mix of financial and technology 
activities of FinTechs. Restoy (2021) goes further by outlining an adjustment to the 
“same activities, same regulation” principle to also include a holistic notion of risks 
in the determination of the regulatory/supervisory perimeter in the complex world 
of fintech services. Siciliani (2018) uncovers the pattern of the strategic reactions of 
banks to the enhanced competition prompted by fintech and highlights the game-
changing effect of public policies regarding access to public infrastructure like 
central bank books.
The various risks posed by dependencies resulting from unbundling have also been 
highlighted by the European Banking Authority (2021). It highlights both the 
importance of visibility regarding the complex pattern of digital interrelations to start 
with, as well as their measurement with indicators that track the risk of dependencies. 
BigTechs expand the range of policy issues. Fragmentation-related issues are still 
relevant. But the relevance of competition, data and complexity issues acquires a 
new dimension corresponding to the role of those issues in shaping their singular 
business models. All in all, the integrated coverage of the new broad range of 
challenges posed by BigTechs makes the coordination of policies a first order 
question. Drawing on the mountains-based analogy that underpins the so called 
“Twin Peaks” model of organising banks’ supervision,9 it is tempting to say that 
BigTech regulation requires a “Sawteeth” model of institutional arrangements, as 
well as new holistic tools to grasp the multi-dimensional mix of externalities posed 
by the scale, diversity and complexity of BigTech operations . 
To start with, the challenge to coordinate competition and data policies with financial 
regulation as regards BigTech activity reflects the ongoing struggle to find a balanced 
fit of digital platforms in society as a whole in Asia, the United States and Europe. 
The quest for a ranking of, or a way of ranking, multiple public policy goals around 
9 In the “Twin Peaks” supervisory model, consumer protection and prudential regulation are carried out by two 
separate regulatory agencies. The name of the “Sawteeth” model is simply intended to highlight, also graphically, 
the additional number of authorities need. The Sawteeth mountains lie in the state of New York whereas “Twin 
Peaks” are fictional. 
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BigTechs, including in the areas of competition, financial stability and rights to data 
protection, is still open. 
In the past arrangements for the coordination of policies relevant to banking have 
seldom been explicit. The trade-off identified between competition and stability 
[Martínez-Miera and Repullo (2010)], together with less-than-ideal regulatory 
instruments, means that some form of implicit coordination is unavoidable [Vives 
(2011)]. In Europe, such coordination has effectively been implicit and top-down, 
drawing on inquiries undertaken by competition authorities that have prompted 
legislative amendments and ultimately the adaptation of bank regulation [Maudos 
and Vives (2019)]. For example, it was a competition investigation of retail personal 
accounts that led to the open banking legislative remedy that has shaken banking. 
Banks were mandated to disclose data on individual consumer transactions, with 
consumer consent, to third-party service providers via a common open application 
interface. 
But the dimension of the competition issues raised by BigTechs has also shaken the 
understanding across the world of the orientation of competition and structural 
measures themselves. The strength of the forces driving the success of BigTechs is 
leading to extensive reviews of the role of digital platforms in the economy and 
society as a whole in China, Europe and the United States. The different principles 
and methods adopted in this ongoing review in different jurisdictions is, at this stage, 
hindering the emergence of a unified model of policy coordination. The risks of 
cross-border fragmentation in platform regulation cannot be countered nowadays 
by international principles and best practice. Even an international agenda on the 
matter is absent today. 
The disparities in the competition reviews undertaken across regions reveal cultural 
and political priorities. China has been implementing a broad range of measures to 
curtail both the role of digital platforms in the economy as a whole and their financial 
operations. On the antitrust front, the publication of Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Platform Economy has targeted the entrenched market power of digital platforms 
and has enabled enforcement actions. On the data front, the legal establishment of 
data rights has been supplemented by obligations to feed information into the public 
scoring system Baihang. The significance of payment management for platforms 
has led to a diverse set of measures to limit the financial return obtained from 
holdings of customer balances (quantitative limits and zero-rate remuneration) and 
to reinforce the role of clearers in the management of customer transfers in order to 
eliminate direct interactions between BigTechs and commercial banks. In addition, 
authorities have imposed tougher anti-monopoly measures on companies in the 
non-bank payments market.
The US leadership in digital platforms markets has not hindered an increasingly far-
reaching review of the need for checks and balances. But the application of 
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competition policy instruments based on long-standing theories of harm dating 
back to the Chicago School of Antitrust Law faces hurdles as a result of the subtle 
economics of platforms that allows for the provision of apparently free services [Wu 
(2018) and De la Mano and Padilla (2018)]. Against this backdrop, insights from the 
data policy camp are gaining weight in the debate despite the lack of a uniform law 
on personal data. Radical formulations of principles on data policy emphasise the 
absence of any allocation of property rights over data in the internet economy and 
the continuous appropriation of them by BigTechs [Zuboff (2019)]. Rebalancing the 
working of digital markets would require, from this viewpoint, an allocation of rights 
that would limit data free-riding by BigTechs. The intensity of the debate has 
increased to the point that the threat of splitting up BigTechs’ franchises has been 
raised [United States Congress (2020)].
In Europe, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) regulates on a cross-sectoral basis the 
delivery of services to customers by platforms. This framework will pave the way for 
administrative antitrust-like procedures adapted to the economics of platforms. As a 
result, the experience of the EU with lengthy antitrust procedures has led to the 
introduction of a new administrative screening mechanism that should facilitate 
prompt intervention and remedies to contain the distortions caused by systemic 
platforms (gatekeepers). A tool envisaged in the DMA responds to a long-standing 
demand for access to data gathered by gatekeepers and contributed by their 
customers through search engines to be opened up to third parties on fair terms. 
But the effectiveness of this remedy may be limited unless the beneficiary third 
parties have a business model with a transactional dimension. 
Against this general backdrop of platform policy initiatives, the emerging financial 
regulatory debate on platforms is informed by the consideration that the benefits of 
technological innovation should not come at the cost of higher risks for bank 
customers, investors and society as a whole. The evolving state of affairs has made 
it difficult to devise a blueprint for the “Sawteeth” model of multiple regulators. 
A  basic impediment relates to the difficulty of ranking policy goals that fall into 
different silos of the legitimacy pyramid. This problem is aggravated when the 
broader challenge is considered, i.e. how to coordinate international policies on 
global players like BigTechs. But even proposals for a “Digital Stability Board”, 
modelled on the FSB, to carry out the coordination of data policies fail to address 
the full range of policies to be aligned.
Still, some have seen the “advisory councils for the digital economy” created in a 
number of countries as providing a starting point. A common agenda would have to 
be worked out based on topics at the intersection of technology, competition and 
regulation, like the ones covered below. This inter-disciplinary approach, based on 
heterogeneous colleges, might facilitate the task of selectively expanding the reach 
of notions like consolidated regulation and supervision to the different sorts of 
partnerships witnessed in the confluence of finance and technology. 
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A more direct alternative, taking into account the urgency of the matter, would be for 
bank regulators to lead the regulatory process straight away by redefining the 
perimeter of regulation. Under this vision, implicit in Restoy (2021), fair recognition of 
the externalities posed by BigTechs would require activity-based rules to be adjusted 
in accordance with entity risk considerations, including scale, complexity and IT 
resilience. But putting these ideas into practice would be far from immediate. 
A potential route in that direction in Europe could be via the overhaul of the financial 
conglomerates directive, as suggested by Noble (2020). 
4.2 Banking-as-a-service and regulation
BaaS has been presented as a middle ground strategy for banks in the digital 
transformation landscape. But the hope it offers as a way of countering competition 
from BigTechs by cooperating with them comes not only with IT intricacies, but also 
legal and regulatory ones. 
BaaS requires specific regulation that allocates rights and risks in an intrinsically 
commingled way of doing banking. Acting as a “white-label” bank serving non-bank 
players entails contractual and regulatory intricacies. Although the arrangement does 
not need to be driven by regulatory arbitrage goals, it could end up having such a goal 
if it is the non-bank partner who effectively has a dominant position and makes the 
due diligence, funding or underwriting decisions in the lending business. The market 
power of BigTechs as BaaS partners of banks with a limited ability to negotiate elevates 
the practical significance of this risk because the former might avoid having to request 
a licence. The outcome of this scenario would be a line of business plagued by moral 
hazard issues similar in nature to those arising under the originate-to-distribute model. 
The mitigation of the moral hazard risks resulting from a potential control of the 
arrangement by BigTechs could eventually have to rely on sectoral macro-prudential 
policies if the problem acquires systemic dimensions. The adaptation of techniques 
used to deal with the distortions of securitisation markets stemming from the originate-
to-distribute model comes immediately to mind. The consolidation of externally 
originated exposures onto the books of the party that truly exerts control over the 
trade has made strides since Enron and after the Great Financial Crisis risk retention 
policies enhanced incentives by compelling skin to be put in the game. Admittedly, the 
application of consolidation techniques and risk-retention policies in the context of 
BaaS contracts with BigTechs would require the institution of a perimeter of financial 
regulation and supervision of these players. The use of economic and technological 
indicators of dependency can provide a basis for that institution.
BaaS with non-BigTech partners may also give rise to credit underwriting issues. BaaS 
entails a potential departure from ordinary risk segmentation systems simply 
because the data quality available from the non-financial partner may not match the 
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modelling practices of the BaaS bank. In particular, the integration of soft and hard 
information may not be feasible with normal in-house procedures. The problem 
grows with the size of the palette of non-financial partners. BaaS thus requires 
specific guidance on model risk to be consistent with sound banking practice.10 The 
adopted governance framework should have an end-to-end perspective, i.e. from 
implementation to use. But the lasting impact of partners’ on-boarding decisions 
means that their contribution is particularly important.
The intricacies of BaaS contracts extend to customer protection and data property 
issues. The fact that the bank and its partner reciprocally exchange services with the 
ultimate aim that they both serve the customer of the former departs from conventional 
agency or outsourcing arrangements. Chart 4 portrays the nature of the commitments 
in a BaaS contract. The ultimate customer proves to be both a customer of the bank in 
a regulatory sense, as it provides its banking licence as an input in the transaction, 
and of the BaaS partner in a commercial sense. 
Customer protection issues may emerge as a result of such commingled allocation 
of responsibilities under the various service agreements to serve the needs of the 
customer. The “ownership” of the customer itself may raise conflicts between 
the parties as regards access to customer data. The more integrated the arrangement 
in the non-bank partner platform, the bigger the risk of confusion of transactional 
data with banking data. The protection of ownership or confidentiality rights over 
data may lead to confrontations between bank and partner or to contractual 
restrictions. Data issues may be especially relevant when the partner is a FinTech 
trying to establish itself via stickiness based on data. 
10 For a discussion of several issues need to be taken into account to integrate alternative credit scoring models 
into the traditional Basel Framework, see Alonso and Carbó (2020).
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BaaS could benefit from several regulatory initiatives. The complexity and risks of BaaS 
arrangements suggest that some standardisation of its main terms could be useful. 
A template that highlights the main contractual events and options to deal with them 
would not only facilitate contracting but also the understanding by regulators and 
supervisors of a complex arrangement. In particular, from an outsourcing analysis 
perspective it would be challenging to map these contracts onto a third-party risks 
analysis breakdown. Embedding these arrangements into third-party service or 
outsourcing rules would contribute towards more balanced relationships between 
banks and their non-bank partners. In particular, when the latter are BigTechs, it 
should lead to the requirement that technology providers involved in the conduct of 
financial services activities are held to similar standards of governance, risk 
management and resilience as financial institutions.
4.3 Platforms and banks
The sponsorship of platforms by banks themselves has been argued to be a 
possible strategic response to BigTech competition. This still fringe strategy, 
deservedly known as “beyond banking” could be challenging for regulators if its 
importance increases in the future. Although this strategy would only be accessible 
to large banks or to consortia of banks, the amount of resources required to be 
diverted for a bank to also operate as a quasi-BigTech potentially entails prudential 
risks. 
But these risks may not be entirely confined to the future. “Beyond banking” can be 
an evolved form of ecosystem-based banking, a strategy that is already widespread. 
This evolution has run more quickly in countries that have maintained some 
independence in their internet technology, like Russia. The state-owned bank 
Sberbank has registered with its regulator its plan to become a leader in technology 
and financial technologies, rather than solely in banking. A similar set of less 
advanced initiatives aimed at launching ecosystems of financial and non-financial 
services has led the Russian authorities to examine regulatory measures [Bank of 
Russia (2021)] to deal with the new risks. 
The need to regulate the transformation of banks into economic platform ventures 
arises from a twofold rationale. First, the ability to venture into a “beyond banking” 
strategy depends on the toughness of regulation as regards the provision of non-
financial services. Jurisdictions where a separation of commerce and banking 
prevails, like the United States, only permit the provision of services ancillary to the 
financial activities. This may restrain the ability to compete in a market where 
network externalities based on transactional data may be crucial. Second, the 
authorisation of a non-cooperative strategy to counter BigTechs’ forays into finance, 
such as “beyond banking”, entails new risks that may affect the banking franchise 
itself. 
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“Beyond banking” exhibits major strategic, governance and IT risks. This model may 
only be feasible when the critical mass needed to replicate the digital platforms of 
BigTechs is low thanks to some sort of national shield like the ones that have allowed 
the internet industry in Russia to remain autonomous. Moreover, although the 
immobilisation of resources to achieve the critical mass may be within the financing 
capabilities of a bank, it may significantly alter the bank’s liquidity and solvency if 
funded with deposits. Prudential bank policy will thus play a role in determining the 
economic incentives and capacity to expand into the creation of technological 
platforms. The dispersion of governance efforts to manage a multiplicity of both 
financial and non-financial ventures is also an important source of execution risk. 
The margin for conflicts of interest with suppliers of products on the platform who 
are also bank borrowers is one example of trade-offs between the platform and the 
banking business. Willingness to engage in cross-subsidisation also puts bank 
solvency at risk. The presence of IT risks in this list of execution challenges should 
not be a surprise at a time when banks increasingly have to resort to outsourcing a 
large chunk of their IT operations to BigTechs due to their magnitude and 
sophistication.
Enabling the “beyond banking” model by lifting rules that separate commerce and 
banking can be both a cultural and legal problem. The separation of commerce 
and  banking is a high-level principle unevenly applied across countries that is 
intended to contain the moral hazard risks of running both banking and commercial 
ventures under a common roof and prevent the safety net spreading across the 
commercial sector. Whereas the United States has preserved structural separation 
rules in banking rooted in that principle, Europe and Japan have embraced universal 
banking, but generally denied banks the possibility of venturing into commerce. The 
issue is not just of intellectual or historical importance, as demonstrated by the refusal 
in 2005 of Walmart’s application for a bank charter and its aftermath and the interest 
of BigTechs [Barth and Sou (2014)]. In the less restricted universal banking jurisdictions 
the cultural debate has not yet begun. 
In dealing with the strategic, governance and IT risks of the “beyond banking” model 
the Bank of Russia adopts a flexible approach based on specific regulation of banks’ 
investments in assets with limited liquidity and uncertain potential for earnings 
generation, the application of internal capital assessment procedures and capital 
add-ons when the platform acquires an unduly large size. The proposals are flexible 
to the extent that they allow banks to offer platform services, but also reflect 
prudential concerns. In an attempt to limit contagion risks, the weight of capital in 
the funding of the platform is required to be higher than that of deposits. The 
incorporation of platform ventures into the internal capital assessment process 
paves the way for a closer understanding of the risks by supervisors. 
Regulation of bank sponsored platforms may be susceptible to conflicts between 
competition and financial regulators. The choice between open or proprietary 
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platforms exposes the conflicts between competition and stability highlighted 
above. Open platforms not only have to allow consumers and providers to move 
quickly to different ecosystems but should also provide options for financing transactions 
by different banks with the ensuing effect in terms of excess competition.
5 Conclusions
Regulating the forays of BigTechs into finance is a daunting task. Regulation needs 
structural pivots to act, but the mix of global commerce, technology and finance of 
BigTechs without local attachment points defies conventional models of public 
action. Regulatory authorities thus need to be arbiters of innovation and financial 
stability pressures with only incipient tools. In the meantime, risks of different sorts 
may accumulate, especially in the transactional segments less subject to more 
holistic risk-based regulations where BigTechs venture more confidently.
An initial difficulty finding the right tools is the size and dynamic nature of the problem. 
As a matter of fact, the agglomeration model of business followed by BigTechs 
across the world has exposed broader economic and social concerns than the ones 
relating to their incursions into finance. The broad set of authorities affected by this 
range of concerns (data, competition, banking and securities, AML, digital economy, 
etc.) needs to work out a structured agenda on the matter that builds a consistent 
policy space. In the past, structural regulation, such as rules separating commerce 
and banking, would have sufficed to differentiate and regulate activities. However, 
surgical actions may be more difficult to implement now in a world with integrated 
markets, while antitrust measures are still blunt tools. Moreover, the challenge for 
national authorities is compounded by the lack of an international agenda that 
identifies acceptable sound principles for consistent action across their respective 
concerns. 
Against this backdrop, the characterisation in this article of the main competition 
modalities of banks in an era shaped by FinTech innovation and BigTech muscle is 
intended to enhance the understanding by authorities of the relevant business 
models that require regulation. Traditional and evolved forms of banking, like bank 
partnerships with FinTechs and neo-banks, are well known and will continue to be a 
widespread reality in the dynamic world of open banking. 
But the banking-as-a-service and “beyond banking” models covered in this article 
are emerging new modalities that deserve the attention of regulators in future. The 
inherent feature of banking-as-a-service or “white-label” banking of providing the 
banking licence involves new risks and challenges. Banking-as-a-service is a biting 
reality in which commercial, banking and outsourcing relationships are comingled 
without proper standardisation or regulatory treatment. Banks are squeezed as 
suppliers of banking services, recipients of cloud service inputs and partners of 
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BigTechs. A consolidated view of the overall input-output relationship highlights the 
risk of moral hazard and the potential role of remedies like risk retention and incisive 
third-part risks and I service rules.
In turn, the “beyond banking” model is currently only an emerging and fringe outcome 
that may also require specific regulation in future possibly based on refinements 
of that applied to mixed conglomerates. The diversion of resources and managerial 
capacity from banking to a broad ecosystem of products entails strategic and 
execution risks that might have negative consequences for banks.
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